I’m the Information Knowledge Manager at the NATO Cimic Centre of Excellence.
Reading your approach to create a CIMIC Common Language guide we would like to request a copy in order to be able to comment to it

with regards
Peter

The experiences of UNOSOM I & II and UNITAF in Somalia, and the debacle in Srebrenica indicate that the political agenda at the UNSC leaves much to be desired when delivering a solid mandate to any force commander or taskforce leader. Clear concise and unambiguous resoutions make for better operations. International Law may be a dynamic thing, but clarity of purpose and drection are essential elements when dealing with subversive or antagonistic/aggressive operations, including the laws relative to detention of prisoners (Geneva Convention 4 or not?).

Not every force commander can be a Peter Cosgrove or David Hurley.

Thanks for the comment!

John Weliver, USMC (Retired)

The case-study you have provided on the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake provides a useful way of looking at the issues that confront all agencies when responding to a disaster situation. In particular, your examples have drawn out the importance of a coherent and coordinated response at all levels. This is a key area that requires a strong focus and is specifically addressed by ‘Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas’ (Principle 5 – Deliver Comprehensive Outcomes).

You contribution asks (1) But what happens when institutional capacity is weak or non-existent?; and (2) Where and how do responding organizations interact with the ‘host government’? These are perhaps two of the key questions that must be answered if a nation is to deliver the most relevant and effective response in a time of crisis.

The Centre is working to address challenges such as these and welcomes contributions to inform the necessary debate. Both questions posed in this contribution would make an excellent topic for a Civil-Military Commentary or a Civil-Military Working Paper (http:civmilcoe.gov.au/resources/) and you are encouraged to further assist us in progressing this work.

I raise the issue of ‘host nation’ institutional capacity for consideration and reference the response to the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake for illustration.

The earthquake killed or seriously injured over 142,000 people and left 3.5 million homeless. The mountainous terrain and climate posed enormous logistical problems for the relief, early recovery and reconstruction operations.

The institutional capacity to respond to the earthquake was already limited due to the terrain. The situation was aggravated by the disruption to civil administration, with 30% of the employed population lost including many public servants. The provincial administrations handed over responsibility to the military and national authorities.

The Government of Pakistan (GOP) responded quickly to the earthquake emergency. On 9 October 2005 the GOP requested the UN to mobilize support including the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) who took lead responsibility the very next day jointly with the Pakistan military.

The GOP also requested the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to coordinate the humanitarian effort. In October 2005, the existing Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) within the cabinet office had a coordination function, but was not equipped for crisis management on such a massive scale. Recognizing this gap, the Government established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) on 10th October 2005. UNOCHA worked closely with the FRC, the military, other UN agencies, the 85 bilateral and multilateral donors and over 100 NGOs. Despite the logistic problems and contrary to some criticisms, the immediate relief activity was rapidly mobilized and operated smoothly under the circumstances.

One missing link in the GOP response was a functioning National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). Recognizing this omission, the GOP in December 2006 issued the National Disaster Management Ordinance establishing the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) and the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). However the National Disaster Risk Management Framework was not approved by the NDMC until March 2007. The newly created NDMA, in accordance with its mandate, organized and coordinated the response to both the 2007 and 2010 Pakistan Floods.

Through the Ministry of Finance (MOF), GOP requested the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) to undertake a Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment (PDNA). This was undertaken between the 24th October and 5th November 2005 and published on 12th November 2005. Planning for reconstruction commenced immediately. The UN conducted a parallel assessment with a particular focus on immediate relief and early recovery. The ADB and WB also conducted a PDNA following the 2007 Pakistan Flood and again, the UN conducted a parallel assessment with a particular focus on early recovery.

Following the 2005 earthquake, the GOP established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) on 24th October 2005 but like all new organizations it was slow to mobilize. Its mission was to “Plan, coordinate, monitor and regulate reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in earthquake affected areas, encouraging self reliance via private/public partnerships and community participation, ensuring financial transparency”. Continuity of leadership was provided between the FRC and ERRA as the Chief Military Coordinator for the military wing of the FRC was appointed the Deputy Chairman of ERRA. This continuity brought with it a focus on decision-making and engagement. When ERRA was established there was a clear need for capacity building for this new agency to take on its complex and difficult role.

There is and has been a debate about the need to establish a new institutions, such as ERRA to plan, coordinate, monitor and regulate reconstruction and rehabilitation activities vis-à-vis using existing arrangements. It is an issue currently seen in Queensland with the recent establishment of the Reconstruction Authority.

Experience suggest that execution should be, to the extent possible through existing implementation arrangements, i.e., through the legally mandated institutions at the local, provincial and federal levels.

But what happens when institutional capacity is weak or non-existent?

Where and how do responding organizations interact with the ‘host government’?

Mr. E. John Blunt has extensive experience in complex and difficult post-disaster recovery projects in the Solomon Islands (following 2007 Earthquake/Tsunami), Pakistan (following the 2005 Earthquake and the 2007 Cyclone/Floods) and Banda Aceh (following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami) and has lectured the Institute for Defense and Business’s Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction (CSER).